Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from our concerns and desires, or are there objective values in the world that we are rationally required to pursue and protect? Alan H. Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible than the rival objectivist position. He provides a naturalistic account of practical rationality in terms of coherence within sets of desires or motivational states, and between motivations, intentions, and actions. Coherence is defined as the avoidance of self-defeat, the defeat of one's own deepest concerns. The demand for coherence underlies both practical and theoretical reason and derives from the natural aims of belief and action. In clarifying which desires create reasons, drawing on the literature of cognitive psychology, Goldman offers conceptual analyses of desires, emotions, and attitudes. Reasons are seen to derive ultimately from our deepest occurrent concerns. These concerns require no reasons themselves but provide reasons for many more superficial desires. In defense of this theory, Goldman argues that rational agents need not be morally motivated or concerned for their narrow self-interest. Objective values would demand such concern. They would be independent of our desires but would provide reasons for us to pursue and protect them. They would require rational agents to be motivated by them. But, Goldman argues, we are not motivated in that way, and it makes no sense to demand that our informed and coherent desires be generally other than they are. We need not appeal to such objective values in order to explain how our lives can be good and meaningful. Reasons from Within will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons, particularly students of philosophy, psychology, and decision theory.

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motw/Reasons From Within_ Desires and Values - Alan H. Goldman.pdf

0199576904.pdf

Goldman, Alan

IRL Press at Oxford University Press

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

Oxford, New York, England, 2009

1, PT, 2010

producers:
Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)

Memory of the World Librarian: Quintus

Includes index.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

<p><P>Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from our concerns and desires, or are there objective values in the world that we are rationally required to pursue and protect? Alan Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible than the rival objectivist position. He provides a naturalistic account of practical rationality in terms of coherence within sets of desires or motivational states, and between motivations, intentions, and actions. Coherence is defined as the avoidance of self-defeat, the defeat of one's own deepest concerns. The demand for coherence underlies both practical and theoretical reason and derives from the natural aims of belief and action. In clarifying which desires create reasons, drawing on the literature of cognitive psychology, Goldman offers conceptual analyses of desires, emotions, and attitudes. Reasons are seen to derive ultimately from our deepest occurrent concerns. These concerns require no reasons themselves but provide reasons for many more superficial desires. <P>In defense of this theory, Goldman argues that rational agents need not be morally motivated or concerned for their narrow self-interest. Objective values would demand such concern. They would be independent of our desires but would provide reasons for us to pursue and protect them. They would require rational agents to be motivated by them. But, Goldman argues, we are not motivated in that way, and it makes no sense to demand that our informed and coherent desires be generally other than they are. We need not appeal to such objective values in order to explain how our lives can be good and meaningful. <P><b>Reasons from Within</b> will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons, particularly students of philosophy, psychology, and decision theory.</p>

"Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from our concerns and desires, or are there objective values in the world that we are rationally required to pursue and protect? Alan Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible than the rival objectivist position. He provides a naturalistic account of practical rationality in terms of coherence within sets of desires or motivational states, and between motivations, intentions, and actions." "Coherence is defined as the avoidance of self-defeat, the defeat of one's own deepest concerns. The demand for coherence underlies both practical and theoretical reason and derives from the natural aims of belief and action. In clarifying which desires create reasons, drawing on the literature of cognitive psychology, Goldman offers conceptual analyses of desires, emotions, and attitudes. Reasons are seen to derive ultimately from our deepest occurrent concerns. These concerns require no reasons themselves but provide reasons for many more superficial desires." "In defense of this theory, Goldman argues that rational agents need not be morally motivated or concerned for their narrow self-interest. Objective values would demand such concern. They would be independent of our desires but would provide reasons for us to pursue and protect them. They would require rational agents to be motivated by them. But, Goldman argues, we are not motivated in that way, and it makes no sense to demand that our informed and coherent desires be generally other than they are. We need not appeal to such objective values in order to explain how our lives can be good and meaningful."--Jaquette

Contents 8
1. Introduction: The Debate 10
I. Deliberation 10
II. Internalism versus Externalism 18
III. Advantages of Internalism: A Modified Humeanism 29
2. Reasons and Rationality 38
I. Reasons Defined 38
II. Rationality: The Information Requirement 54
III. Rationality: The Coherence Requirement 66
3. Emotions, Desires, and Reasons 92
I. Emotions and Desires 92
II. Desires, Depression, and Rationality 107
III. Desires and Reasons 117
4. The Externalist’s Examples 130
I. Learning Reasons for Desires 130
II. Prudence 141
III. Moral Motivation 152
IV. A Different Approach and a Last Ditch Reply 183
5. The Case Against Objective Value 195
I. Objective Value and Motivation 195
II. The Impartial and Impersonal Perspectives 211
III. Pleasures and Pains 231
IV. Good and Meaningful Lives 243
6. Conclusion 265
Index 272
A 272
B 272
C 273
D 274
E 275
F 275
G 276
H 276
I 276
J 277
K 277
L 277
M 277
N 279
O 279
P 280
Q 281
R 281
S 282
T 283
U 283
V 283
W 283
Z 284

'Reasons from Within' defends the view that all our reasons for acting derive from our desires, and ultimately from our deepest concerns. There are no objective values in the world that could require our concerns to be other than they are. It will be of interest to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons

2025-10-27