Do We Control What We Believe? Are We Responsible For What We Believe? These Two Questions Are Connected: The Kind Of Responsibility We Have For Our Beliefs Depends On The Form Of Control That We Have Over Them. For A Number Of Years David Owens Has Investigated What Form Of Control We Must Have Over Something In Order To Be Held To The Norms Governing That Thing, And Has Argued That Belief, Intention And Action Each Require A Different Type Of Control. The Forms Of Freedom Appropriate To Each Of Them Vary, And So Do The Presuppositions Of Responsibility Associated With Each Of Them. Issues In The Moral Psychology Of Belief Cast Light On Some Of The Traditional Problems Of Epistemology And In Particular On The Problems Of Scepticism And Testimony. In This Series Of Ten Essays Owens Explores Various Different Forms Of Control We Might Have Over Belief And The Different Forms Of Responsibility They Generate. He Brings Into The Picture Notable Recent Work In Epistemology: On Assurance Theories Of Testimony, On 'pragmatic Encroachment', On The Aim Of Belief And On The Value Of Knowledge. He Also Considers Topics In Related Fields Such As The Philosophy Of Mind (e.g. The Problem Of Self-knowledge And Theories Of The First Person) And The Philosophy Of Action (e.g. The Guise Of The Good And The Role Of The Will In Free Agency). Finally, Owens Suggests A Non-standard Reading Of The Sceptical Tradition In Early Modern Philosophy As We Find It In Descartes And Hume. Seven Of The Essays Collected Here Are Previously Published, One Has Been Heavily Revised, And Two Are Previously Unpublished. Owens Provides A Substantial Introduction Bringing Together The Themes Of The Essays. -- David Owens. Includes Bibliographical References (239-244) And Index.

motw/Normativity and Control - David Owens.pdf

Owens, David

IRL Press at Oxford University Press

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

First edition, Oxford, 2017

Nov 07, 2017

Oxford, 2019

1, PS, 2017

producers:
Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)

Memory of the World Librarian: Slowrotation

Cover 1
Normativity and Control 4
Copyright 5
Dedication 6
Preface 8
Contents 10
Introduction 12
I.1 Problems of Epistemic Normativity 12
I.2 Practical Freedom and Reflective Control 17
I.2.1 Reflection and Self-Control 17
I.2.2 Reflective Control and the Will 21
I.2.3 Objections 22
I.3 Epistemic Akrasia? 26
I.4 Belief and Reflective Control 30
I.4.1 Evidentialism 30
I.4.2 The Impotence of Reflection 34
I.5 Forms of Accountability and Control 37
I.6 The Problems of Authority and Control 42
Part I: Normativity: Epistemic and Practical 46
1: Epistemic Akrasia 48
1.1 The Judgement Condition: Moore ́s Paradox 49
1.2 The Judgement Condition: Transparency 51
1.3 The Control Condition: Evidential Akrasia 54
1.4 The Control Condition: Epistemic Akrasia 59
2: Does Belief Have an Aim? 62
2.1 Truth as the Aim of Belief 63
2.2 Believing and Guessing: Rationality 68
2.3 Believing and Guessing: Control 74
2.4 Conclusion 78
3: Deliberation and the First Person 80
3.1 What is Deliberation? 80
3.2 Practical and Theoretical Deliberation 84
3.3 Reflective Maintenance: Shoemaker 88
3.4 Reflective Reasoning: Burge 90
3.5 Reflective Deliberation 93
3.6 Conclusion 97
4: Value and Epistemic Normativity 98
4.1 The Bayesian Challenge 99
4.2 Alethic Conceptions of Belief 100
4.3 Pragmatic Conceptions of Belief 105
4.4 Belief and the Passions 109
4.5 Epistemic Norms and Normative Interests 114
Part II: Scepticism 122
5: Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume 124
5.1 Cartesian Scepticism 124
5.1.1 The Role of the Sceptical Hypotheses 126
5.1.2 Hume ́s Misreading of Descartes 128
5.2 Humean Scepticism 130
5.2.1 Scepticism about Reason and the Senses 131
5.2.2 Scepticism about Induction 134
5.3 Descartes, Freedom, and Certainty 136
5.3.1 Theodicy 136
5.3.2 Freedom and Certainty 138
5.3.3 Reflection and Certainty 139
6: Descartes ́ Use of Doubt 143
6.1 The Role of Reflection 145
6.2 The Need for Certainty 149
6.3 Descartes ́ Conjectures 153
6.4 Descartes ́ Suppositions 156
Part III: Practical Freedom 160
7: Freedom and Practical Judgement 162
7.1 What is Practical Judgement? 162
7.2 Judgement and Ignorance 166
7.3 Judgement and Knowledge 169
7.4 Practical Freedom 174
8: Habitual Agency 180
8.1 Acting from Habit 182
8.2 The Guise of the Good 185
8.3 Habits and Policies 189
8.4 Habits and Virtues 194
Part IV: Testimony 202
9: Testimony and Assertion 204
9.1 Expressing and Indicating Belief 205
9.2 Assertion as Expression 209
9.3 Assertion as Assurance 212
9.4 Testimony 216
9.5 Conclusion 221
10: Human Testimony 222
10.1 The Rational Entitlement Model of Testimony 223
10.2 The Inheritance Model of Testimony 229
10.2.1 Veracity 230
10.2.2 Credulity 232
10.3 Objections and Clarifications 236
10.4 Assertion and Assurance 240
10.4.1 Assertion without Assurance 241
10.4.2 Testimony without Assurance 243
Bibliography 250
Index 256

Do we control what we believe? Are we responsible for what we believe? These two questions are connected: the kind of responsibility we have for our beliefs depends on the form of control that we have over them. For a number of years David Owens has investigated what form of control we must have over something in order to be held to the norms governing that thing, and has argued that belief, intention and action each require a different type of control. The forms of freedom appropriate to each of them vary, and so do the presuppositions of responsibility associated with each of them. Issues in the moral psychology of belief cast light on some of the traditional problems of epistemology and in particular on the problems of scepticism and testimony. In this series of ten essays Owens explores various different forms of control we might have over belief and the different forms of responsibility they generate. He brings into the picture notable recent work in epistemology: on assurance theories of testimony, on 'pragmatic encroachment', on the aim of belief and on the value of knowledge. He also considers topics in related fields such as the philosophy of mind (e.g. the problem of self-knowledge and theories of the first person) and the philosophy of action (e.g. the guise of the good and the role of the will in free agency). Finally, Owens suggests a non-standard reading of the sceptical tradition in early modern philosophy as we find it in Descartes and Hume. Seven of the essays collected here are previously published, one has been heavily revised, and two are previously unpublished. Owens provides a substantial introduction bringing together the themes of the essays. -- Provided by publisher

2025-10-27