Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.ISBN : 9781107172661

zlib/no-category/Tim Roughgarden/Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory_28174498.pdf

Roughgarden, Tim

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

1, PS, 2016

Computer Science And Economics Have Engaged In A Lively Interaction Over The Past Fifteen Years, Resulting In The New Field Of Algorithmic Game Theory. Many Problems That Are Central To Modern Computer Science, Ranging From Resource Allocation In Large Networks To Online Advertising, Involve Interactions Between Multiple Self-interested Parties. Economics And Game Theory Offer A Host Of Useful Models And Definitions To Reason About Such Problems. The Flow Of Ideas Also Travels In The Other Direction, And Concepts From Computer Science Are Increasingly Important In Economics. This Book Grew Out Of The Author's Stanford University Course On Algorithmic Game Theory, And Aims To Give Students And Other Newcomers A Quick And Accessible Introduction To Many Of The Most Important Concepts In The Field. The Book Also Includes Case Studies On Online Advertising, Wireless Spectrum Auctions, Kidney Exchange, And Network Management -- From The Publisher. Introduction And Examples -- Mechanism Design Basics -- Myerson's Lemma -- Algorithmic Mechanism Design -- Revenue-maximizing Auctions -- Simple Near-optimal Auctions -- Multi-parameter Mechanism Design -- Spectrum Auctions -- Mechanism Design With Payment Constraints -- Kidney Exchange And Stable Matching -- Selfish Routing And The Price Of Anarchy -- Over-provisioning And Atomic Selfish Routing -- Equilibria : Definitions, Examples, And Existence -- Robust Price-of-anarchy Bounds In Smooth Games -- Best-case And Strong Nash Equilibria -- Best-response Dynamics -- No-regrets Dynamics -- Swap Regret And The Minimax Theorem -- Pure Nash Equilibria And The Pls-completeness -- Mixed Nash Equilibria And Ppad-completeness. Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University, California. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.

This book gives students a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field of algorithmic game theory. It demonstrates these concepts through case studies in online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

2024-03-28