"The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content." "To show how these principles are realized in specific domains, Peacocke applies the theory in detail to several classical problems of philosophy, including the nature of perceptual entitlement, induction, and the status of moral thought. These discussions involve an elaboration of the structure of entitlement in ways that have applications in many other areas of philosophy. He also relates the theory to classical and recent rationalist thought, and to current issues in the theory of meaning, reference and explanation. In the course of these discussions, he proposes a general theory of the a priori." "The focus of the work lies in the intersection of epistemology, metaphysics, and the theory of meaning, and will be of interest both to students and researchers in these areas, and to anyone concerned with the idea of rationality."--Jacket

lgrsnf/F:\lib\0199270724,9780199270729,.pdf

nexusstc/The Realm of Reason/e61f35c44d0e17519704e0b3f1d2a224.pdf

zlib/Society, Politics & Philosophy/Anthropology/Christopher Peacocke/The Realm of Reason_815792.pdf

Peacocke, Christopher

Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press

IRL Press at Oxford University Press

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

Oxford University Press, USA

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

Oxford University Press USA, Oxford, 2004

Oxford, New York, England, 2004

OXFORD, Unknown, 2004

New Edition, 2004

January 6, 2004

lg391153

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Referenced by: doi:10.1007/bf00869630 doi:10.2307/3326862 doi:10.2307/2025075 doi:10.1093/0199241279.001.0001 doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.x doi:10.2307/2185680 doi:10.2307/2678391 doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8958-0 doi:10.1093/0199246270.001.0001 doi:10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 doi:10.1007/bf00354523 doi:10.1093/bjps/45.1.1 doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00148.x doi:10.1017/cbo9781139172714 doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1184-6 doi:10.2307/2678390 doi:10.2307/2183532 doi:10.1007/bf00353523 doi:10.2307/2184861 doi:10.1017/cbo9780511554476 doi:10.2307/2653512 doi:10.1093/0195032047.001.0001 doi:10.2307/2185051 doi:10.2307/2653521 doi:10.2307/2026276 doi:10.1017/cbo9780511840715 doi:10.2307/2678392 doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.1993.tb00031.x doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1994.tb00228.x doi:10.2307/1522964 doi:10.2307/1522959 doi:10.1093/0198238606.001.0001 doi:10.2307/2678383 doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00167 doi:10.1093/0195078624.001.0001 doi:10.2307/3326699 doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 doi:10.2307/2182832 doi:10.2307/2182858 doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251 doi:10.2307/2185261 doi:10.2307/2678388 doi:10.1086/669025 doi:10.1016/0010-0285(70)90002-2 doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244073.001.0001 doi:10.1093/0198237073.001.0001 doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001 doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00206.x doi:10.1017/cbo9780511621253 doi:10.1017/s0031819100000632

Includes bibliographical references and index.

0199270724......Page 1
Contents......Page 10
Introduction: Reasons and Sense......Page 12
1.1 The First Principle of Rationalism......Page 17
1.2 Reference and Truth in the Explanation of Reasons......Page 26
1.3 The Significance of the Quinean Challenge......Page 35
1.4 Evidence and Meaning:The Need for a Middle Way......Page 45
1.5 How To Avoid the Problems......Page 60
2.1 The Second Principle of Rationalism......Page 63
2.2 Entitlement:The Three Levels......Page 71
2.3 The Second Level for Perceptual Entitlement......Page 76
3.1 The Argument Outlined......Page 85
3.2 The First Step:The Explanation of Complexity......Page 86
3.3 The Second Step:The Application to Perceptual Experience......Page 97
3.4 The Third Step:The Philosophical Explanation of Perceptual Entitlement......Page 108
3.5 Features of the Treatment......Page 117
4.1 Applications......Page 120
4.2 An Extension to the Philosophy of Action......Page 132
4.3 Rationality and External Individuation......Page 134
4.4 Is the Explanatory Task an Illusion?......Page 140
5 Induction......Page 146
5.1 A Thesis and its Consequences......Page 148
5.2 Indispensability......Page 155
5.3 Induction, the Second Principle of Rationalism, and the A Priori......Page 157
6.1 The Third Principle of Rationalism......Page 159
6.2 Varieties of Rationalism, and the Middle Way......Page 163
6.3 Two Species of the A Priori......Page 170
6.4 How Moderate Explanatory Rationalism Aims to Explain......Page 180
6.5 Tasks for the Metasemantic View......Page 190
6.6 Does Naturalism Exclude the A Priori?......Page 205
7 Moral Rationalism......Page 209
7.1 The Claim of A Priori Status......Page 210
7.2 The Claim Defended......Page 216
7.3 Explaining the A Priori Status of Morality: A Schema......Page 231
7.4 The Subjectivist Fallacy......Page 237
8.1 Is Moral Rationalism Consistent with Moral Realism?......Page 243
8.2 Moral Rationalism and Explanation: The Eirenic Combination......Page 252
8.3 The Emotions and Moral Rationalism......Page 263
8.4 Entitlement, the Emotions, and Two Relations to a Representational Content......Page 269
9. Conclusion......Page 277
Appendix: List of Main Principles and Definitions......Page 279
Bibliography......Page 281
C......Page 290
F......Page 291
L......Page 292
P......Page 293
T......Page 294
Z......Page 295

<br><em>the Realm Of Reason</em> Develops A New, General Theory Of What It Is For A Thinker To Be Entitled To Form A Given Belief. The Theory Locates Entitlement In The Nexus Of Relations Between Truth, Content, And Understanding. Peacocke Formulates Three Principles Of Rationalism That Articulate This Conception. The Principles Imply That All Entitlement Has A Component That Is Justificationally Independent Of Experience. The Resulting Position Is Thus A Form Of Rationalism, Generalized To All Kinds Of Content.<br>to Show How These Principles Are Realized In Specific Domains, Peacocke Applies The Theory In Detail To Several Classical Problems Of Philosophy, Including The Nature Of Perceptual Entitlement, Induction, And The Status Of Moral Thought. These Discussions Involve An Elaboration Of The Structure Of Entitlement In Ways That Have Applications In Many Other Areas Of Philosophy. He Also Relates The Theory To Classical And Recent Rationalist Thought, And To Current Issues In The Theory Of Meaning, Reference And Explanation. In The Course Of These Discussions, He Proposes A General Theory Of The A Priori.<br>the Focus Of The Work Lies In The Intersection Of Epistemology, Metaphysics, And The Theory Of Meaning, And Will Be Of Interest Both To Students And Researchers In These Areas, And To Anyone Concerned With The Idea Of Rationality.<br>

## Abstract
In his The Realm of Reason, the author proposes a theory that states the conditions under which a thinker can be said to be entitled to form a given belief. The author's ‘Generalised Rationalism’ is based on three principles of rationalism, each framed as a claim about the relation of entitlement. The theory is rationalist in that it holds, against empiricism, that some entitlements are a priori, i.e. justified independently of experience; it is generalised in that it holds that all kinds of content have a component that is a priori. The status of these entitlements as a priori is founded in a particular way in the network of relations between entitlement, understanding, and truth. The author applies his theory in detail to several classical philosophical problems, including the nature of perceptual entitlement, induction, and the status of moral judgements. In the course of these discussions, the author develops a theory of the structure of entitlement and a general theory of the a priori, elaborates on the nature of Generalised Rationalism by juxtaposing it to classical and recent rationalist thought, and elucidates the general implications the truth of his theory has for theories of meaning, reference, and explanation.

This work develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content and understanding and the author formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception.

How are good reasons for forming a particular belief connected with the conditions under which that belief is true?

2011-04-18