There are two main ways in which things with minds, like us, differ from things without minds, like tables and chairs. First, we are conscious--there is something that it is like to be us. We instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, our world as being certain ways. We instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the phenomenal and the representational related?
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upload/motw_shc_2025_10/shc/The Phenomenal and the Represen - Jeff Speaks.pdf

motw/The Phenomenal and the Represen - Jeff Speaks.pdf

Speaks, Jeff

IRL Press at Oxford University Press

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

First edition, Oxford, 2015

Illustrated, 2015

producers:
Acrobat Distiller 9.4.5 (Windows)

Memory of the World Librarian: Slowrotation

Cover 1
The Phenomenal and the Representational 4
Copyright 5
Dedication 6
Preface 8
Table of Contents 12
PART I: Two Kinds of Properties of Subjects 14
1: Phenomenal Properties 16
2: Representational Properties 21
PART II: From Transparency to Intentionalism 32
3: Varieties of Intentionalism 34
4: Transparency 39
5: Two Impossible Scenarios 48
6: Phenomenism and Phenomenal Variance 54
7: The Interpersonal Constraint, the Time Constraint, and the Memory Constraint 57
The Interpersonal Constraint 57
The Time Constraint 59
The Memory Constraint 62
8: Phenomenal Variance and Property Variance 65
9: Extending the Argument to Other Phenomenal States 68
PART III: Intermodal Intentionalism and Nonconceptual Content 70
10: Belief and Intermodal Intentionalism 72
11: Direct Arguments for Nonconceptualism 78
12: A Dilemma for Fregeanism about Sensed Contents 83
13: Frege’s Puzzle and the Content of Thought 89
Minimal Fregeanism 91
Informative Fregeanism 105
PART IV: The Metaphysics of Representational Properties 110
14: Properties and the Nature of Russellian Contents 112
15: Properties and the Attitudes 121
PART V: Availability and the Scope of Perceptual Representation 132
16: Availability 134
17: Demonstratives and the Availability Requirement 139
18: The Perceptual Representation of Objects 146
19: The Problem of ContingentlyExisting Contents 150
20: The Perceptual Representationof Natural Kinds 156
21: Independence, Fallibility, Anti-Circularity 160
22: Appearance Properties 168
Appearance property-ism, phenomenal variance, and Scenarios A and B 169
Fallibility, Independence, and Availability 171
Anti-Circularity 176
23: Relativist Views of Sensible Qualities 179
PART VI: How Many Phenomenal Relations? 184
24: Phenomenal Relations 186
25: The Distinctions Between the Senses 190
26: Binding and Bodily Sensations 199
27: Shifts in Attention 202
PART VII: Phenomenal Identity and Indiscriminability 214
28: Identifying Phenomenal and Representational Properties 216
29: Phenomenal Content 221
30: Phenomenal Content and Phenomenal Continua 232
31: Perceptual Constancies and Phenomenal Match 239
32: Phenomenal Content and the Representation of Change 245
33: Indiscriminable Phenomenal Properties 248
PART VIII: The Reduction of Phenomenal Properties 254
34: Two Kinds of Theories of Phenomenal Properties 256
35: Functionalist Theories of Content 258
Indication Theories 259
Co-variational Theories 263
Internalist Functionalism 264
Limited Holism 265
36: Functionalist Definitions of Phenomenal Relations 269
37: Identity Theories 276
Phenomenal Properties and Sensing Relations to Contingent Things 276
Distinctness/Discriminability and Multiple Realizability 280
Identity Theories and Perceptual Constancies 281
The Reducibility of Phenomenal Relations 284
Bibliography 286
Index of Names 292
Index of Topics 294

This title is about two kinds of properties of perceiving subjects: their phenomenal properties, and their representational properties. It focuses on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? What is the relationship between phenomenal and representational properties? Machine generated contents note: pt. I Two Kinds of Properties of Subjects -- 1. Phenomenal Properties -- 2. Representational Properties -- pt. II From Transparency to Intentionalism -- 3. Varieties of Intentionalism -- 4. Transparency -- 5. Two Impossible Scenarios -- 6. Phenomenism and Phenomenal Variance -- 7. The Interpersonal Constraint, the Time Constraint, and the Memory Constraint -- 8. Phenomenal Variance and Property Variance -- 9. Extending the Argument to Other Phenomenal States -- pt. III Intermodal Intentionalism and Nonconceptual Content -- 10. Belief and Intermodal Intentionalism -- 11. Direct Arguments for Nonconceptualism -- 12. A Dilemma for Fregeanism about Sensed Contents -- 13. Frege's Puzzle and the Content of Thought -- pt. IV The Metaphysics of Representational Properties -- 14. Properties and the Nature of Russellian Contents -- 15. Properties and the Attitudes -- pt. V Availability and the Scope of Perceptual Representation -- 16. Availability -- 17. Demonstratives and the Availability Requirement -- 18. The Perceptual Representation of Objects -- 19. The Problem of Contingently Existing Contents -- 20. The Perceptual Representation of Natural Kinds -- 21. Independence, Fallibility, Anti-Circularity -- 22. Appearance Properties -- 23. Relativist Views of Sensible Qualities -- pt. VI How Many Phenomenal Relations? -- 24. Phenomenal Relations -- 25. The Distinctions Between the Senses -- 26. Binding and Bodily Sensations -- 27. Shifts in Attention -- pt. VII Phenomenal Identity and Indiscriminability -- 28. Identifying Phenomenal and Representational Properties -- 29. Phenomenal Content -- 30. Phenomenal Content and Phenomenal Continua -- 31. Perceptual Constancies and Phenomenal Match -- 32. Phenomenal Content and the Representation of Change -- 33. Indiscriminable Phenomenal Properties -- pt. VIII The Reduction of Phenomenal Properties -- 34. Two Kinds of Theories of Phenomenal Properties -- 35. Functionalist Theories of Content -- 36. Functionalist Definitions of Phenomenal Relations -- 37. Identity Theories. Jeff Speaks. Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

First, we are conscious-there is something that it is like to be us. That is, we instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, the world around us. That is, we instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the phenomenal and the representational related?

We differ from things without minds in two main ways. First, we are conscious: we instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent our world as being certain ways: we instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks explores the nature of phenomenal properties and of representational properties, and the relationship between them.

2025-10-27